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INTERNATIONAL LAW: WHERE HAVE WE BEENi 
WHERE ARE WE GOING? 
AMOS N. GUORX 
1. INTRODUCrlUl\ 
lnternaltonal lcn·v, much. like the bw of nation-stat�s, is in a 
st<1te of flux. There is great uncertai nt) r�garcling it� applicabillty 
in what J (and others) refer tu as thl' "post 9/11 world." Needless 
to s<�y, not all agree with we th21t the worid significantly changed 
the1t Tucsdtty morning. They sut;g�;:sr thut the Bush Adn1inislralfon 
response is best defined as <l "mas�ive ovcr-rcaclion/' and that 
history will show the attc1Cks to be no rnor�e lhc lll Cl blip on history's 
pc�gcs. 
My hero, Winston Churchill, would no doubt scoif at such an 
analysis and would-perhaps-offer these comrnentalors a black 
umbrella, the famous accessory of �he Nc�zi-appeasing former 
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Neville 01amberlain. 
While Chamberlain was horribly wrong and cxtraorditl<uily naYve, 
I do not suggest that those vvho disagree with me are that. I would 
argue that the significance of 9/11 is as yet unknown and thal 
history vvill judge. While I carry the name of the Old Testament 
prophet, Amos, l am- as the phrase goes-neither a pTophel nor 
tbe son of one. 
1 am1 however, a student of history with significant 
professional experience in the legc1l and policy aspects of 
operational counterterrorism.. T have a !so spent innumere�ble 
waking hours �"rith Palestinian terrorists in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip. Conversations with those P.1lestinians lead me to the 
following convictions: terrorists are hell-bent on achieving their 
· Professor of Law, S.J. Quinney College of L1w, The University of Ut<1h. J 
1\'nLtld like to th(lnk Prof David Luban, Georgetown Lc11v School elnd Prof Tom 
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goal and compromise with terrorists is extraordinarily 
compLicC�tccl. Exceptions exist- the IRA-British Agreement is the 
obvious one-but they require brave political leadership and a 
confluence of mutual self interests, Both, as 1 shall discuss, arc 
hard to come by. 
Yitzhak Rabin vvas wont of saying, "we shall fight terrorism as 
if there is no peace process and we shall flght for peace as if there is 
no terrorism." While Rabin was known to loath Yasser Arafat, he 
understood that the occupation (followi_ng the 1967 Six-Day ·war) 
of the West Bank and Gna Strip had become untenable for 1 sraeli 
society politically, morally and financially. 
This understanding was his primary motive for going forth 
with a process of which he was most skeptical. His skepticism was 
deeply rooted and was not - as some have suggested - predicated 
on his fundamental distrust of the Accord's architect and his long­
time political rival, Shimon Peres. Rabin cam.e to understand what 
the Israeli philosopher Yeshayahu Leibowitz sa·id in the immediate 
aftermath of the War: "the occupation will be a cancer on IsraeU 
society." Leibowitz was spot on, to say the very leasl. 
How Israel hi.1S articulated its positions in the context of 
international law has been the subject of innumerable articles, 
conferences, polemics, and diatribes. Some have been justified, 
others not. What is critical - from the perspective of this Article­
is how the nation-state conducts operational counterterrorism on 
multiple fronts while seeking to respect international law. Israeli 
counterterrorism is complicated by the occupation of the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip. However, it is criticc1l to remember for 
purposes o f  historical accuracy that Palestinian terrorism did not 
begin in June 1967; the Palestine Liberation Organization was 
established on Jcmuary 1, 1965 and Palestinian terrorists 
(previously reierrcd to as fednyeeu) have been attucking Israel since 
its cr('ation in May 1948). 
This background serves as the basis for a discussion regarding 
the essence of international law, and to whett ends and means it is 
used. The follow-up question is whether internt�tional law n1.eets 
the test of contemporary and future relevance, This is not C'l loaded 
question but rather an attempt to analyze the current state of 
interne1tional law. 
Two more, relevant, personal points of introd uction are in 
order. During the course of my Israeli Defense Force (" IDF") 
career I vvas deeply involved in" on the ground" i mplementation 
of the Oslo Accords-(when I served as the Legal Advisor to the 
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Gaza Stlip)- and l had significant interaction with th'" foreign 
1neclia r<-"'gt'lrdinr; Jsr<H�Ii legal policy with respect to the Gaza Strip 
and West Bank. These postings obligated me to understand hmv 
to best implement international law and how to explain such 
implementatjon. The challenge of explaining the internationnl lGI\V 
rationale of Israeli policy to a skeptical media corps was somrtin1es 
only matched by the difficulty of explaining international law 
obligations and responsibilities to IDF command�rs; whose 
primary focus, naturc11ly, was on their operational considerations. 
A final comment before delving in: these words are vvritlen 
against the following back-drop- I recently lectured to my 
eighteen year-old son's IDF peer group on the legal aspects of 
counterterrorism. That group will be inducted into the fDF d\1ring 
2009, many of them will be the next generation of junior 
con1manders chnrged with implementing international law in what 
is literally a "mission impossible." How they will ba lc:mce 
operational considerations wilh humanitarian responsibilities will 
detern1ine- in many ways-their success as soldiers and 
commanders. lt will also define their morality and respect for the 
rule of law. 
The need to operationalize international law j/'olll the perspective 
of tlie C011llllt1!1der is, I suggest, c:m absolutely critical requirc:ment of 
academic.s, policy-makers, human rights organizations, and 
military commanders Uunior and �enior alike) , Otherwise, the 
commandet" wi11 be stuck with yesterday's rules in today's- and 
tomorrows- conflict. The inherent unsuitability of these rules to 
the con.fJict will both make public international law increasingly 
irrelevant from the perspective of the single most important 
practitioners- the commanders-c:�nd will do a fundam.ental 
disservice to those who most critic ally need its protection­
innocent civilians. 
Operationalizing International law sets the guidelines and 
parameters for the new conflict, thereby providing the comm<:mder 
with the most appropriate and relevant tools of lhe trade. 
Otherwise, tragedy is inevitable. SNAFU and FUBAR 11111:>t not re­
enter our l exicon in a rnilitarv context. That is the ultirn.atc thesis 
this Article seeks to convey. The req u isite first step is, with all due 
haste, operationalizing international law. 
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2.. Oi>ERATIONALIZINC INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The innocent civilicln is entitled to international humanitarian 
law pTotections. That is obvious. lf the individual is a combatant 
and therefore meets criteria to be defined as legitimate target then, 
all bets are off, with the cavcal thlll the soldier must act when 
dealing with this combatant i n  accorclancc w1th the critical 
principles of intern,1tional law: proportionality, alternatives, 
military necessity, and collateral dame1ge. But what is the solider 
to do when the scenario is in the hazy, foggy middle that defies 
ee�sy categorization and classification? The extremes are easy, the 
middle is complicalccL Classic internationa 1 law and internationa l  
hum.anitarian principles are dear with respect to the former; l 
sugges t they are unhelpful regarding Lhc latter. Unfortunately, 
operational counterterrorism is most complicated in the haze that 
is all but inevit8blc when fncts are unclear, how is the soldier to 
act? Relying on time-honored principles developed i..n different 
operational contexts m01y not provide sufficient guidelines. 
I suggest the critical word in examining international law is 
balance. Perhaps <1dvocates of theoretical international law will 
take exception lo thal suggestion. Fair enough and understood. 
Hovvever, I suggest the practical application of international law 
requires l weaking the term by adding the word "operational ." 
That is- the field-l�vel interpretation and implementation of 
international law is best described as "operational international 
law." That is the answer to the question posed in the title o.f this 
Article, "Where We are Going?" 
3. HOW DO WE CET Tl-IERE? 
Balat.Ke has become a magkE�l word in describi.ng government 
policy in response to governm.cnt action. As I have written 
elsewhere, there is a need to balance between the rights of the 
individual and the equally legititTtate national security rights of the 
state. My colleC�gue and friend, Dean 1--fir<:lrn Chodosh suggests 
using the term "maximizing" rights. Whether we "balance" or 
"nu1ximize," we seek to articulate that not all rights will be fully 
preserved, protected, .:�nd respected in the context of government 
nnd response. One of the important questions from em operational 
perspect ive is to whom intcrnutional law protections are to be 
extended and u nder what circumstances? The easv answer ts 
"everyone.'' That, of course, is PollyatUlaish and impossible. 
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Some, such as Professor DC1vid Cole, have argued thnt 
constitutional prolections should be extended to non-Americans 
detained by the United States. While that is a minority position, it 
raises importan t questions concerning the expnnsion of 
constilutionnl rights to an otberw ise un protected class. Two of the 
most important issues in operational counterterrorism are: (1) 
when is em individual a lcgitim,ltc target, and (2) how is direct 
involvement defined? While relevant international law principles 
regarding military necessity, proporlionzllity, alternatives, and 
collnteral damage are well-known <1nd often discussed, I am 
ilKH'asingly of the beliet that they are insufficien t il1 most 
effectively setting the par2m1cters of oper21Lional counterterrorism. 
Civil democratic societies- if they ilre subject to the rule of 
law-must internalize the limits of power in conducting 
operational counterterrorism. The lirnits of power are translated 
into respect for .international humanitarian law and the 
commander's subsequent obligation to conduct military operations 
in nccordance with a greements to which the governmen t is a 
c;ignntnry HowPver, the criticc:�l qm�stion is, cloPs in�en1alionallaw 
and international humanitarian law sufficiently lake into account 
the ever-chcmging nature of conflict? 
1 have argued that the post 9/ J 1 conflict is not "war on 
terrorism" but rather that the correct (albeit clumsy) termjnolo gy is 
"armed conflict short of war." The essence of operational 
cmmterterrorism. is a soldier st21nding opposite someone (male or 
female, young or old) dressed in civ.iliclll clothes, and literally until 
the last moment the soldier does not know whether that civilian is 
innocent or not. The resulting question is critical to the 
discussion- does he wail an extra second before shooting? After 
all, that one extra second em be the difference between life and 
denth for the soldier . On the other hand, it can lead to the 
inadvertent killing of an innocent civil inn. 
How do we resolve this dilemma? T suggest the following 
three paradigms: (1) if the soldier killed an individual later 
determined to be an innocent civilian and there was no justification 
for the shooting, then the soldier must be court-martialed; (2) if the 
5>oldier shot an indi\ idual later determined to be an imwcent 
civilian lmt the conduct objectively raised the soldiers SLl.spkion 
(mam1cr of dress, body lan guage, field circumstances, etc.), then 
the decision whether to brjng the soldier before a disciplinary 
hearing or a court martial depends on a careful analysis of the facts 
and thoughtful application of the law; and (3) if the soldier killed 
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an individual determined to be a combatant, then tht.:re need be no 
judicial or disciplinary process. The quantum of evidence required 
is, [ suggest, rects0nc.1ble suspicion that the individucll presented a 
life threatening situation to tbe soldier or other unprotected 
individuals in the "zone of combat." 
4. BY WHAT t'v!E,\SuRE DO WE EVALUATE THE SOLDlU(S ACTIO�S? 
The question is whc\l conduct do we expect from soldiers' in 
the zone of combat. The following vignette best e>-.ploins this 
proposition: in rny last position in the roF 1 had commJnd 
responsibility .for the development of an interactive video teachjng 
soldiers how to conduct themselves vis-a-vls a civilian population. 
The video ta ught a ten point "code of conductr' based on 
international lavv1 the IDF code and Israeli law. In conjunction 
with commanders, I demonstrated the video to field units. In early 
2004, r was invited to show the video to a paratroop battalion. 
After the soldiers viewed the video, the commander said the 
following: "if you [the soldier] are unsure as to whether tbe 
individual standing opposite you is an innocent civilian or 
(Ombatant, you will wait an extra second before shooting." The 
soldiers responded in w1ison attacking the commander for 
unnecessarily endangering their lives and having, in essence, 
signed their death sentence (the IDF is known for ils open and 
frank discussion philosophy between commanders and sokUers). 
The batta lion commander repeated himself and the soldiers 
repealed themselves, at which point the commander said the 
following: "by my order-and this is the order of the day-you 
will wait an additional second." 
Tbat is not to suggest that international law is not relevant to 
ceJtC1in operational engagements and contexts. My point is simply 
that it is not wholly helpful to the soldier standing opposite an 
individual who he does not know, and in large parl cannot assess 
vvhether he presents a lhreat or not. 
Re-stated/ T am increasingly concerned that lhe haziness that 
typifies operational counterterrorism is not addressed by 
international lc-•w� To that end, I suggest re-thinking international 
law and adopting a more operationt1l approach. While some will 
argue that extending the reach of the law is problematic, the reality 
is that there is a direct rele�tionship and confluence between the law 
and operational cm1nterterrorism. Commm1ders and others can 
kick and scream, but their operational reality must include legaJ 
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considerations and limita tions imposed by the law- like it or 
dislike it. 
5. THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ENABLING OPERATIONAL 
COU!\:TERTERROR ISM 
That being said, the lavv nwst help them out. Otherwise, tragic 
mistakes will be made that will result in unnecessary deaths of 
soldiers and innocent civilians alike. By operationalizing 
international law the intent is to enable commanders to conduct 
aggressive, operational counterterrorism subject to legal limitations 
given contemporary realities. After all, the reality of the m.odern 
age is the absolute need to conduct operational counterterrorism. 
To think otherwise i s  either misbegotten or disingen uous. 
Precisely because that is the reality and because multiple audiences 
require protection, there is a need to define terms in a manner that 
enables operational counterterrorism while protecting the 
innocent. 
Perhaps this is a difficult task, but  there is no choice or 
alternative. While terms such as proportionality are known to 
commanders and soldiers alike, what do they actually mean to 
them? How are they to translate it  operationally? These concepts 
imply restricting the scope of operational engagement, but it is 
equally important to dearly articulate what soldiers and 
comn1anders are pern1.itted to do. That is, not only say "no to this 
and that" but "yes under such and such circu mstances." 
Guidelines must also enable action, not only forbid it.1 
To that end, operational international law must enable soldiers 
and commanders to engage a broad range of individuals involved 
in terrorism. That is the essence of what I propose should be the 
guiding spirit of operational counterterrorism. Simply stated, 
terrorist orga.niza tions involve numerous categories of individuals 
without whom terrorism cannot exist. It  is well-neigh impossible 
to plan and execute a terrorist attack (other than lone wolf actors) 
otherwise. 
Case-in-point, the extraordinarily sophisticated, well-planned 
and well-executed attack in Mumbai on November 26 and 27, 2008 
involved countless individuals. Those involved went far beyond 
the terrorists who actually carried o u t  the simultaneous attacks. 
1 This was brought home to me on numerous occasions when asked to speak 
before IDF soldiers regarding international law. Their frustration vvas that so 
much of the language is "prohibitory" rather than facilitating. 
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The legitimate t<1rgets extend to the planners, logisticians, 
financiers, and supporters. Those individuals are direct 
partlC1pants. What constitules partic ipa lion is a matter to be 
defined tacticallv. The strategic decision is whether to define 
l egit in1ate target bro,ldly or narrowly. 1 suggest applying the 
broad definition is the only \\'ay opcrC�tional counterterrorislll Gill 
be conducted. However, the definition can not be open-ended for 
that would reflect l11\Nle�sness. 
To concretize the discussion and tu highlight how 
e traordinarily problema tic the issue can be, 1 suggest the 
fol lowing two vignettes, which arc based on press reports. (While 
thjs means lhtlt that their \'eracity is question8ble, they 
nevertheless serve il5 useful discussion points) . 
V ignette #1: 
According to initial reports, the Murnbai attack vvas 
financed by an fndian citizen living in Saudi Arabia 
Vignette #2: 
According to initi c ll reports, the Mcu11bai attackers had 
established-months in advance-command ce.nters in the 
Taj Mahal and Oberoi hotels (there is no such report with 
respect to the Bet Ha bad). 
Before del ving inlo an <malysis of who presents a greater threat, 
the financier or the logistician, f would suggest that the same 
reasonable suspicion test articulated above is relevant in this 
context. In applying this test to the four international law 
principles previously mentioned, the question is when and under 
what circumstances <we these individuals legitimate targets. 
Indeed, these actors- financiers and logisticians-represent the 
If new actor" for whom intern a tionc:d law must provide 
conm1anders with an operational checklist. That checklist- or 
guidelines-will most effectively enable the commander to tmget 
those vvbo must be targeted while seeking to protect the innocent. 
Targeting is problematic word for it implies, fran kly,  killing 
someone. My support (or" targeted killings '' is conditinned on the 
following: that the target presents a significant threat to national 
security, that there are no alternati\•es to neutralizing the thrent 
(such as arrest), and lhat the collateral damage will he, at Lhe most, 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol30/iss4/7
2009] lNTL LAW: WHERE ARE WE GOING? 1331 
minimaJ.2 With those condit ions articulated and implemented, 
then the reasonable suspicion test suggests that both categories are 
legitimate targets. The issue becomes who implements the 
targeting <mel to what extent? I suggest that if the financier 
(according to media reports) is in Saudi Arabia then the natural 
choice is the Saud i's, as it is all but im possible to expect the royal 
fcomlily to allow Indian special operation commandos to perform a 
hit on Saudi soil. On the other hand, in the context of "anything is 
possible" I would suggest not ru l ing that option out. That same 
oossibilitv exists should the individual choose to travel 
I J 
i.ntern?lhOn<ltly and if he operationally presents hin1sel f. 
How does international law - as presently construed - define 
the "financier"? Truth be told, it docs not precisely do so because 
international law was designed to address state-to-state issues. 
The fimmcier as a legitimate target represents an increasingly 
important operational counterterrorisn1 issue. As l have argued 
elsevvhere, if inte lligence is the basis for counterterrorism then 
finance is the core of terrorism. Simply put, without financiers 
terrorist attacks, such as Mumbai, do not occur. Perhaps easier to 
execute, less sophisticated attacks do occur, btlt absent the correct 
financing mult i-target attacks carried out after months of plaru1ing 
involving tens (if not more) individuals wil l  be less likely to occur. 
[f the financier is essential to the attack is he not equivalent to a 
combatant? The answer, in my opinion, is yes. 
Indeed he is more tha n a combatant because the terrorists 
cond ucting the actual attack are numerous while the financier is a 
single ind ividuaL Thus, he is more i mportant than any single, 
specific individual actually shooting and kill ing unarmed, im1ocent 
civilians. To that end, in an expansive view of operational 
international la'"-', I suggest that, predicated on reliable and valid 
intelligence information and in the absence of any practical 
alternatives (primaril y detention), the financier is a legitimate 
target when involved both in planni ng how to finance and i n  
executing financial measures. The financier meets a n  expanded 
definition of direct part icipation that goes beyond the actual zone 
of combat. 
� See Amos N. Guiora, Targeted Killiiig as Self Defeu::.c, 36 C\SE W. RES. J. JNT'L 
L. 319, 322 (2004) (defining "targeted killing" as a deliberate decision to order the 
death of a terrorist or other person who presents a serious threat to public order 
and safety as established by criminal evidence or reliable corroborated 
intelligence). 
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That is not to diminish the s ignificance of the logistician b u t  
rather t o  hLghlight the extraordinary i mportance o f  t h e  fi nancier. 
Press reports indicate that there was one financier i nvolved in the 
Mumbai e1ttack, while there Me an unknown n u mber of 
individuals involved in various aspects uf pl<mning and logistics. 
l n  the context of carefully iden tifying who i::; a legit ima te target I 
would .suggest that a lawful, expansive articulation of operational 
international lc-nv w i l l  not tolerate excess. The oper8tive 
terminology that must be adopted should be a careful and prudent 
approe1ch that expands the definition of lcgitimnte tCirgel. 
ecrhaps i t  is more CICCUrate to say irl Jrticu latin g an C'\pansivc 
view of operational i n ternational le1w tbC\t the zone of combat i s  
cullc/-et�cr terrorist a t tacks are plc-mned mui cxecu ted. The logical 
coroll<lry to thal is whoever is in that zone of cornbat is a legitimate 
target. But international humanitarian lC\w lllliSf act as a bu ffer or 
as cl restra i n t  in determining who is a legitimate lJrgel and when. 
Tbis buffer concept takes on added importance i n  the expansive 
view of operational international law thCit .I <llll suggesting. f n  
proposing a n  expansive view I am deliberately not addressing 
critical issues of self defense, as I have done clsewhere,3 for the 
purpose of this Article is to raise a separate - albeit related - issue 
of the functionality of operational i n ternational lavv. Needless to 
say, self-defense is the essence of lawful state action, but my 
proposal a t  its core is l i m i ted to re-defining international .law. 
6. DEALING WITH THE LOGISTICIANS 
What about those involved i n  the planning? How should my 
proposed expansive definition be applied to those who reserved 
hotel rooms for extended periods, enabling the establishment of 
command centers? lf we can establish that they knevv, then they 
too are direct participants. However, are they legitimate tCirgets? 
Even in an expansive view of i nternational lElw, J would suggest 
that those responsibJe for logistic arrangements a re not l egitin1ate 
tmgets to the same extent as tbe financier1 without whom the 
oper<:llion cannot proceed. However -and the however is  
critjcs l - the logisticians can not geL a free ride. They are an 
1 .See Amos N. GuiorJ, An ticipnt[lrtf Sl!lrDe:fell:>c nml l11temntionnl Lnw-l\ Re­
[vtJ!unlivn 1-2 (Univ. of Utah S.J. Quinney College of li1w LL'gal Studies Research 
Paper, Research Paper No. 057-8-10, 2008), twnilnble n! http:// papL'rs.ssrn.com 
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1264883 (discussing the importance of self defens(' 
in combating terrorism in the context of war). 
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intrinsic dement of the attack; their efforts are crucial to its success. 
Borrowing fron1 an a i r  force example, while they are not the pilots, 
they arc responsible for the plane's "reC�diness." Any con1bat pilot 
knows that without a superb ground crew team the most 
expensive and sophisticated F-16 will not be combat ready. 1 
suggest that the same holds true i n  the terrorist paradigm. lf, 
indeed, a comtTland center was established in the two hotels and if 
that fac i l i tated the attacks, then those responsible for creating the 
centers were direct pmticipants. T..f they are alive an.d arrested, then 
the Indian legal system must mete out punishment according to 
the Indian criminal code.-! 
That is obvious and does not, I believe, require re-articu.lating 
international law. What is relevant is asking whether they were 
legit i mate tm·gcts while engaged in the act of-for instance­
reserving the hotel rooms or bringing supplies to the rooms. The 
easy ansvver is that they fall into the detainable category. This i s  
obvious. However, what if for operational reasons they were not 
able to be arrested, and the only way to neutralize their activity 
WCJS to kill them? That is the harder question. It  is also a n  
uncomforta ble question as  those reserving hotel rooms have not 
traditionally been considered terrorists or legitimate targets. 
Advocates of traditional international hu manitarian law w i l l  
v i gorously shake their heads and steadfastly argue that expanding 
the definition of "direct participation" and "legitimate target" is 
nothing more than the beginning of a slippery slope. They wil l  
suggest that such an idea is "GITMO" re-incarnated, and that 
expansiveness will  result in u nconscionable violations of human 
rights. On many levels, they are right, and in respect to many 
issues, I wholeheartedly agree with them. However, in analyzing 
the Mum.bai raid and its affect on future terrorist attacks, I suggest 
i t  is too easy to automatically say "no" to expanding definitions. 
With respect to the financier, I am convinced of the need to 
expand the definition. However, with respect to logisticians, I a m  
less convinced: they may well  be the beneficiaries o f  international 
humanitarian law protections and g u idelines. That said, the 
M u m bai attack clearly shows the critical role played by those not 
traditionally considered combatants. While they are not holding 
the gun, these individuals Lnake holding the gun a possibility. In 
that sense, they are participating, and perhaps directly so. They 
4 For a discussion of Indian counterterrorism policy see AMOS N. GUIORA, 
GLOBAL PERSI'ECT!VESON COUNTERTERRORISM 167-72 (2007). 
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are not innocent by-st< mders who deserve im munity and they are 
not entitled to protections offered non-con•bat<mts. Whether or not 
they are combatants as traditionally understood is an issue that 
going for th must be discussed because sophistica ted terrorist 
opera tions depend on them. 
As to innocent bystanders, there is no need to expand 
international lilw beyond the accepted understanding of collateral 
damage. While innocent civilic-ms invariably ax1d inevita bly pay 
the price for terrorism and counterterrorism a like the nation state is 
obligated to minimize tha t price. 1 t is far too easy (cmd 
unreasonable) to s,w that operationdl counterterrorism m u st result 
in zero loss ot innocent life. But, it is reasonable to demand 
commanders to respect the principle of minimizing. However, 
under no circumstances can commanders order a deliberate allack 
on innocent civi l ians. No expansive definition of operational 
internationa l  law can or should tolerate such an order. lt i s  
bla tantly illegal (if indeed given) a nd requ ·i res the immediate 
interven tion by comm<mdcrs and lavv enforcement a l ike. 
International humanitarian law need not, and rm£st not, bend with 
respect to the protection of innocent civilians. 
However, internationa l humanitarian law and international 
Jaw nwst understand lhat post 9/11 there is a need to re-arliculale 
exjsting definitions lo enable the state to conduct aggressive 
operationa l counterterrorism. That is most effectively facilitated by 
developing, articula ting and im.plemen ling opera tional 
internalional lavv in response to a ttacks such as Mumbai. These 
attacks are the wave of the future. Existing principles and 
definitions do not adequately meet the ne\".r challenges posed by 
such a t tacks. 
I. Oi'!E FINt(\L WORD 
As with any controversial proposal, debate is a musl. There is 
a clear need to consider, a nalyze, and Llnderstand the significance 
of events such as Mumbai. They are not going away. 
I wish to thank tJn:� editors o£ the journal of ln tenwtionnl Law fm 
providing me the forum and opportun ity to raise my proposa l 
Needless to say, l loo.k forvvard to shnrpening rny argu.11'lent arld 
thesis in response to comments and questions. 
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